/da-reviewSingle-pass devil's advocate review that finds every flaw in a target — code, plan, diff, or design — without applying any fixes.
Use /da-review when you want an adversarial critical read of something and a prioritised list of problems to act on yourself. It reviews once and stops — it does not loop, does not spawn fix agents, and does not modify any files.
Key distinction from /iterative-review: /da-review identifies problems; /iterative-review identifies and fixes them in a loop until no critical, major, or moderate issues remain. Choose /da-review when you want to stay in control of the fixes; choose /iterative-review when you want problems resolved automatically.
Typical trigger situations:
Pass a target to review as the argument. If no argument is supplied, the current plan or code in context is reviewed.
/da-review [target]
Parameters:
[target] — (optional) what to review: a file path, a git diff snippet, a plan file path, or a description. If empty, the skill reviews the current plan/code/work in context.Pre-approved tools: Read, Grep, Glob. Pre-approval does not restrict other tools; the skill's instructions forbid fixes — it only reports findings.
Severity rubric (same as /iterative-review — kept in sync):
Input:
/da-review $(git diff HEAD)
Output / Result:
## Critical
- C1: `process_payment()` calls `charge_card()` without checking the return value.
If charge fails silently, the order is marked paid without actual payment.
## Major
- M1: No transaction rollback if `save_order()` throws after `charge_card()` succeeds.
A crash here leaves the customer charged but orderless.
## Moderate
- Mo1: `MAX_RETRY` is hardcoded to 3; should be configurable via env var.
## Minor
- N1: Variable `tmp` in line 47 — rename to `pending_charge` for clarity.
Overall: Critical issue C1 must be fixed before this diff is safe to commit.
Input:
/da-review plans/FEAT-042-auth-redesign.md
Output / Result:
## Critical
(none)
## Major
- M1: Task 3.2 adds a new `/logout` endpoint but no task covers session token invalidation on the server side.
Users who log out remain authenticated until the token expires.
- M2: No rollback plan defined. If the migration in Task 4.1 fails in production, the
previous auth tables are gone.
## Moderate
- Mo1: Acceptance criteria for Task 2.1 do not mention rate-limiting the login endpoint.
## Minor
- N1: Task numbering jumps from 3.4 to 3.6 — likely a copy-paste error.
Overall: Two major gaps that could cause a security regression — recommend addressing before implementation begins.